I · Technical
Deep diagnosis and infrastructure fixes on complex systems.
Low-level systems work where the bug class is non-obvious and the spec
and the implementation have quietly diverged.
OpenVINO Intel GPU plugin — __local-pointer kernel
compilation fixes + shared-header API extension
openvinotoolkit/openvino
·
2026
-
Diagnosed a systemic OpenCL compile failure across the GPU plugin’s
LoRA, MoE, and fully-connected kernels on Intel Compute Runtime 23.x+
— the
__local-pointer overloads of
intel_sub_group_block_read* were dropped from the base
cl_intel_subgroups extension and now require
cl_intel_subgroup_local_block_io, which most current Intel
discrete GPUs (Arc, Battlemage, Lunar Lake) don’t advertise.
Anyone running LoRA or MoE inference on that hardware was hitting
compile errors.
-
Designed an API extension to the shared
sub_group_block_read.cl
header — new __local-pointer overload family
(_sub_group_block_read_l*) +
DECLARE_BLOCK_READ_LOCAL_EMULATION companion macro +
two-tier dispatch (extension fast path / OpenCL C 2.0+ inline-emulation
fallback) — and migrated four kernels onto it across two PRs,
auto-fixing a fifth via macro rerouting. Design approved by the
subsystem architect and merge gatekeeper; validated on real Arc-class
hardware via Intel’s DG2 internal CI.
Available for contract work on inference performance, low-level systems
diagnosis, and infrastructure debugging — particularly where the
problem sits at the seam between vendor driver, framework, and application.
II · Policy
Strategic and regulatory analysis for industrial and defense sectors.
Long-form analysis on industrial capability, regulatory architecture, and
the institutional seams where contract and implementation diverge.
The diagnostic stance carries across domains. I read complex regulatory and
industrial systems the same way I read complex codebases: trace the
contract, find where the implementation drifted, write up what the gap
means and what to do about it.
The recommended structural alternative is the same in both domains:
government-owned, contractor-operated capacity for the infrastructure
that markets will not maintain.
Friction by Other Means — how regulatory infrastructure preserved
tariff effects after IEEPA fell
Essay · 2026 · ~7,600 words
The Trump II IEEPA tariff regime collapsed at the Supreme Court on
February 20, 2026, but its practical effects largely did not. Tariff
revenue, by Treasury’s own projection, will be “virtually
unchanged” in 2026. Import friction — CBP audit pace, CF-29
issuance, first-sale challenges, transshipment enforcement, FDA
entry-review centralization, de minimis closure, TTB queue
lengthening — is at or above the IEEPA-era peak. Refunds are
slow-walked through technical capacity constraints layered onto a narrow
legal interpretation.
The strongest reading of the evidence is structural convergence with
intentional ratification. Most of the infrastructure (CEEs, ACE,
PREDICT, FSMA, FAA Act permitting, CBP audit authority) long predates
the administration and has its own bureaucratic logic, but the timing,
sequencing, public framing, and refund-mechanism design in 2025–2026
indicate the administration recognized the alignment and chose to
operationalize it. The durable variable in modern American tariff policy
is not the headline rate but the regulatory infrastructure that
surrounds it.
The Structural Failure of America’s Defense Industrial Base —
property, profit, and the production crisis
Essay · 2026 · ~4,200 words
The United States placed its war-fighting capacity inside publicly
traded corporations whose legal obligations run to shareholders, not to
readiness. In 2024, seven major defense primes returned 98 percent of
free cash flow to investors. Surge capacity — idle factories,
warm production lines, redundant suppliers — generates no
shareholder return and gets cut. Operation Epic Fury exposed the
result: 800 Patriot interceptors fired in five days against an annual
production of 600; 168 Tomahawks fired in the first 100 hours against
five-year purchases of 322; one carrier covering the Pacific while the
fleet rebalances to the Persian Gulf.
The defense industrial base does not atrophy despite the market
working correctly. It atrophies because the market is working
correctly, toward an objective that has nothing to do with national
security. The structural alternative is the Government-Owned,
Contractor-Operated model — proven across 73 facilities in World
War II and still operational for nuclear weapons production —
which retains public ownership of productive capacity while leveraging
private operational expertise.
The Great Recentralization — civilizational risk in the cloud-AI
transition, 2026–2046
Essay · 2026 · ~9,000 words
The locus of meaningful computation has migrated from devices owned and
controlled by users to a small set of hyperscale data centers operated
by five American firms and one Taiwanese fabricator. Five threat
vectors compound: economic concentration exceeding the railroad and oil
trusts; surveillance infrastructure beyond what the Stasi could
operate; supply-chain fragility centered on a single fab on a contested
island; documented atrophy of cognitive capacity in populations that
offload reasoning; and the disappearance of the off-grid-capable
personal computer.
The cloud-AI transition is the enclosure of compute, of model weights,
of the digital commons of personal data, and ultimately of cognition
itself. The historical pattern is that enclosure, once accomplished, is
not reversed by markets, only by politics. Existing antitrust and
right-to-repair instruments regulate the symptoms of platform power
while the underlying enclosure of compute proceeds unimpeded.
Available for retainer engagements with defense industry trade
associations, investment firms with international exposure, and policy
shops working on industrial capability and regulatory architecture
questions.